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Highlights
•	 The	study	of	five	EU	regulatory	regimes	for	electricity	TSOs	(Belgium,	Ger-
many,	Great-Britain,	France	and	the	Netherlands)	suggests	that	their	designs	
encompass	 strong	 tensions	and	 trade-offs.	Four	main	economic	properties	
are	at	stake:	the	capability	to	(a)	sufficiently	remunerate	TSO	investments,	(b)	
reduce	the	risk	borne	by	TSOs,	(c)	incentivise	TSO	cost	reduction,	and	(d)	
transfer	efficiency	gains	to	final	users.	No	regulatory	regime	can	simultane-
ously	reach	the	highest	level	of	performance	for	each	of	these	properties.	
•	 The	existing	national	regulatory	regimes	show	a	significant	heterogeneity	of	
intrinsic	trade-offs.	This	can	be	understood	as	a	legitimate	heritage	from	the	
past,	and	a	consequence	of	the	previous	paths	of	network	and	regulatory	re-
gimes	in	an	“isolated	country”	manner	giving	absolute	priority	to	a	particular	
set	of	local	economic	properties.
•	 However,	these	isolated	national	contexts	should	no	longer	be	valid	as	the	Eu-
ropean	Union	is	pushing	more	than	ever	to	prompt	for	wider	integration	and	
increasing	interactions	between	power	networks	and	power	systems.	In	any	
regional	EU	market,	the	economic	properties	of	national	regulatory	regimes	
must	consequently	be	realigned	and	harmonized	so	as	to	contribute	more	to	
the	EU	common	good.
•	 This	harmonization	of	regulatory	regimes	should	take	into	account	the	TSOs’	
capability	to	finance	the	investments	required	for	projects	of	pan-European	
significance.	In	our	new	EU	paradigm,	incentives	for	“national	only”	cost	re-
duction	should	be	ranked	second	in	favor	of	“Pan	EU”	key	issues	such	as	re-
ducing	cost	of	capital,	minimizing	investment	risk,	and	guaranteeing	invest-
ment	financeability.	The	“coalition	of	the	European	willing”	should	push	the	
entire	zone	to	a	more	favorable	environment	for	regional	TSO	investments.
1.	 This	policy	brief	summarizes	the	thinking	and	the	results	of	the	FSR	research	report:	“Incen-
tives	for	investments:	Comparing	EU	electricity	TSO	regulatory	regimes”	(2014)
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Background
The	 European	 Network	 of	 Transmission	 System	 Operators	
for	 Electricity	 (ENTSO-E)	 identified	 in	 the	 latest	 Ten	 Year	
Network	Development	Plan	that	€104	billion	investments	are	
required	in	the	next	ten	years	in	projects	of	pan-European	sig-
nificance.	These	 considerable	needs	 for	 electricity	 infrastruc-
ture	investments	are	grounded	in	the	new	challenges	that	the	
European	Union	faces	to	achieve	the	EU	internal	market,	the	
decarbonization	of	the	electricity	generation	mix	and	the	mas-
sive	renewal	of	infrastructures.
The	achievement	of	such	investment	plans	requires	the	Trans-
mission	System	Operators	(TSOs)	 to	be	able	 to	finance	these	
investments	 at	 the	 lowest	 cost	of	 capital.	All	national	 regula-
tory	regimes	which	frame	the	behavior	of	EU	TSOs	should	be	
adapted.	 TSOs	 should	 ensure	 their	 long-term	 financeability,	
either	individually	or	collectively.	It	means	being	able	to	raise	
a	sufficient	amount	of	equity	and	debt	to	finance	their	foreseen	
investments.	
It	is	also	needed	that	national	regulatory	frames	are	coordinated	
to	some	extent.	This	is	exemplified	with	TSOs’	new	industrial	
structures,	 with	 TSOs	 operating	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 regulatory	
borders	and	making	the	national	regulatory	frames	interact.	
It	 then	appears	 essential	 to	 study	 the	potential	 consequences	
and	interactions	of	national	regulatory	choices	with	regard	to	
network	investments	for	the	development	of	the	pan-European	
market.	 We	 consequently	 address	 five	 major	 EU	 regulatory	
frameworks	 in	Belgium,	France,	Great	Britain,	Germany	and	
the	Netherlands.	They	are	already	connected	within	a	common	
regional	 (North-West)	 market	 and	 host	 more	 than	 half	 of	
the	EU	electricity	generation.	We	analyze	and	compare	 them	
through	a	set	of	theoretical	and	empirical	principles	to	identify	
the	 key	 economic	 properties	 of	 these	 five	 national	 regulatory	
regimes.	We	then	estimate	the	potential	outcomes	of	the	regula-
tory	regimes	when	put	together	in	the	context	of	existing	regional	
market	integration,	and	open	a	discussion	toward	the	need	for	
some	more	coordination	and	key	harmonization	targets.
Economic properties of regulatory regimes
Joskow	(2008)	states	that:	“the primary goal of regulation in the 
public interest is to stimulate the regulated firm to produce output 
efficiently from cost and quality (including reliability) perspectives, 
to price the associated services efficiently, and to achieve these 
goals consistent with satisfying a break-even or budget-balance 
constraint for the regulated firm that allows the firm to covered its 
costs of providing service while restraining its ability to exercise its 
market power to exploit consumers by charging excessive prices”.
To	 achieve	 these	 goals,	 monopoly	 regulation	 deals	 with	 dif-
ferent	concerns.	First,	incentive	regulation	is	built	on	the	idea	
that	between	the	regulator	and	the	operator	there	is	an	infor-
mation	asymmetry	about	the	cost	function	and	the	achievable	
effort	to	reduce	cost.	The	theory	has	also	examined	the	impact	
of	different	 regulatory	 instruments	on	 the	 level	of	 risk	borne	
by	 the	operator	and	what	 their	consequences	are	 in	 terms	of	
investments	 and	financeability.	Finally,	 the	 regulatory	 regime	
applied	 to	 the	TSO	will	 also	determine	how	efficiency	gains/
losses	are	shared	with	the	grid	users.
Four	economic	properties	are	key	to	analysing	the	TSO’s	invest-
ment	behaviour	in	the	frame	of	incentive	regulatory	regimes.	
They	make	it	possible	to:	a)	sufficiently	remunerate	the	opera-
tors’	investments	and	ensure	their	financeability,	b)	reduce	the	
risk	borne	by	the	operator,	c)	incentivize	cost	reduction	and	d)	
transfer	efficiency	gains	and	redistribution	to	final	users.
Comparing national regulatory regimes; 
assessing their economic properties
The	 economic	 literature	 covers	 different	 types	 of	 regulation,	
based	on	various	regulatory	instruments	such	as	cost-plus	reg-
ulation,	revenue	caps,	menu	of	contracts	and	yardstick	compe-
tition.	The	details	of	 the	construction	of	an	actual	 regulatory	
regime,	especially	 in	electricity	 transmission,	are	however	 far	
more	complex.	A	regulatory	regime,	such	as	those	observed	in	
the	five	countries	of	our	report,	can	be	described	as	mixing	dif-
ferent	theoretical	instruments	to	end	up	in	a	periodic	revenue	
cap.	The	simplest	version	of	such	a	frame	consists	in	fixing	the	
allowed	revenue	for	the	regulated	services	provided	by	the	net-
work	operator.	To	implement	it,	several	characteristics	have	to	
be	defined,	such	as:	
1.	 The scope of the revenue cap,	which	 represents	how	 the	
different	types	of	costs	are	integrated	in	the	revenue	cap,	
or	are	treated	separately	through	other	specific	efficiency	
specifications,	 or	 are	 not	 incentivized	 at	 all	 (building 
blocks vs. TOTEX).
2.	 Efficiency tools & targets	 should	 be	 defined	 in	 order	 to	
balance	incentives	for	cost	reduction	with	transfer	of	effi-
ciency	gains	to	final	users.	This	could	be	done	using	spe-
cific	tools	to	assess	relative	efficiencies (benchmarking vs. 
internal efficiency audit) 
3.	 Capital remuneration	(in particular the allowed cost of 
capital or WACC)	should	be	defined	in	order	to	balance	
incentives	for	investments	and	TSO	financeability	with	the	
resulting	tariff	level	for	final	users.
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Analyzing	 the	 TSO	 regulatory	 regimes	 in	 Germany	 (period	
2014-2018),	France	(period	2013-2016),	Belgium	(period	2012-
2015),	the	Netherlands	(period	2014-2016)	and	Great-Britain	
(period	2013-2021)	with	 regard	 to	 these	 characteristics	 leads	
to	a	classification	of	these	regimes	into	three	main	categories.	
Belgium and France use a “building blocks” approach.	 They	
treat	different	categories	of	costs	differently,	mainly	excluding	
investments	 from	 the	 revenue	 cap	 and	 lowering	 the	 strength	
of	incentives	regarding	this	type	of	costs.	They	are	then	mainly	
remunerated	 through	a	“cost-plus”	 (or	pass-through)	mecha-
nism.	The	building	blocks	approach	is	complemented	by	effi-
ciency	 audits	 on	 the	 investment	 budgets	 (ex ante	 approval	
of	 investments	 and	 ex post	 potential	 control	 of	 investments).	
Once	the	investments	are	made	and	accounted	in	the	Regulated	
Asset	Base,	they	are	subject	to	a	straight-line	depreciation	and	
they	are	remunerated	according	to	a	pre-determined	allowed	
cost	 of	 capital	 (WACC).	This	 approach	 can	be	 considered	 as	
bearing	low-risk	on	the	TSOs	since	the	main	part	of	the	costs	
is	treated	as	pass-through	items.	In	contrast,	this	approach	pro-
vides	modest	incentives	on	cost	reduction	because	it	does	not	
optimize	the	trade-offs	between	OPEX	and	CAPEX,	resulting	
there	in	a	modest	transfer	of	efficiency	gains.
Germany and the Netherlands use a “TOTEX” approach.	They	
include	most	 investments	 in	 the	revenue	cap	scope.	They	are	
by	nature	bringing	more	incentives	on	cost	reduction	than	the	
building	blocks	regimes,	even	more	so	as	efficiency	targets	also	
apply	to	old	investments	(in	the	Regulated	Asset	Base),	whose	
costs	are	 sunk	and	cannot	be	changed	anymore.	This	 regula-
tory	regime	is	therefore	bringing	more	risks	for	the	TSO	than	
the	 building	 blocks	 regime.	 Moreover,	 both	 Germany	 and	
Result 1: Comparing the economic properties of five national regulatory regimes
The choice of a design option in a regulatory regime opens room to tensions or trade-offs between its basic economic properties. No 
regulatory regime can simultaneously reach the highest level of performance for each of these properties. Our figure below gives a 
simplified representation of such economic properties, with regard to the different trade-offs being observed. Some regulatory regimes 
are more favourable to investments and potential long term benefits for final users, hence favouring lower risks for the TSO and a higher 
financeability (e.g., France). However, such regimes only provide modest incentives for cost reduction and the transfer of efficiency gains 
to final users in the short term. In contrast, other regimes are focussing more on short term benefits for final users, using higher transfer 
of efficiency gains and strong incentives for cost reduction (e.g., the Netherlands). However such regimes are often conducive to TSO 
higher risks and lower financeability. The North-West national regulatory regimes show there a significant heterogeneity with regard to 
their economic trade-offs. 
Comparison of economic properties and trade-offs of the North-West regulatory designs
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The	Netherlands	favor	inter-TSO	benchmarking	as	a	key	tool	
to	define	 the	 required	 efficiency	 levels.	The	use	of	 inter-TSO	
benchmarking	is	based	on	the	preliminary	assumption	that	the	
various	transmission	regulatory	environments	and	“doing	busi-
ness”	environments	(rules	of	law,	of	administrative	behavior,	of	
social	and	industrial	relationships,	etc.)	are	sufficiently	similar	
Result 2: Target for a regulation harmonization at the regional level
In the new era we are in, the cost of capital and the financeability issues are key for the EU as a whole as well as individually for each TSO. 
If giving an absolute priority to cost reduction was an excellent idea in a period of low investment and low technology innovation (like 
GB did from 1990 to 2010), it is no more such a priority at times of massive investments and innovation. In Great Britain, after two decades 
of “lowering OPEX” and lowering tariffs, we might assume that the general level of efficiency should be quite fair today and the impact of 
further efficiency effort on the transmission tariff will only be smaller.
As a result, more harmonisation of regulation regimes at the North-West regional level should bring a more favourable environment for 
investments. A new balance between TSO investment risks and TSO efficiency incentives should be found to accommodate new targets 
as capital cost reduction and favourable financing structures. The existing regulatory regimes should start to decrease the risks borne 
by the TSOs, such as relying too much on benchmarking analysis with too limited data increases the TSO risks. Hence benchmarking 
might be combined with other efficiency tools and used more as an informative and a negotiation tool. More broadly incentive regula-
tion should conceive a set of mechanisms dealing with uncertainty and a continuing process of improvement of these mechanisms.  To 
maintain the network utilities’ financeability, a good equilibrium should also be found between short-term profit sharing and the allowed 
WACC. In some cases, remuneration of capital for investments should therefore be increased, efficiency targets should be moderated, and 
the scope or the tools of incentive regulation should be reviewed. The next figure illustrates a possible trajectory of regulatory conver-
gence for Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Great-Britain.
If this harmonisation target cannot be reached, under-investment might be expected (lowering the future quality of network services or 
missing the objectives of energy transition and EU internal market building). A higher cost of capital for network investment would also 
occur when network operators experience too much risk. It might increase the financeability issue and lead to further increasing the 
future network tariffs.
A regional harmonization target
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for	all	scored	companies	so	as	to	not	interfere	with	the	scoring	
results.	Given	that	this	 inter-TSO	environment	comparability	
is	generally	not	ensured	across	countries,	we	can	assume	that	
an	 international	 benchmarking	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 additional	
regulatory	 risks	 for	 the	TSOs.	Of	 course	German	and	Dutch	
regulatory	regimes	present	variances	as	each	of	these	regimes	
implements	 the	 benchmarking	 tool	 differently,	 and	 the	 cost	
scope	of	 the	efficiency	 targets	differs	 from	one	 regime	 to	 the	
other.	Comparatively,	the	German	approach	looks	more	robust	
because	the	inter-TSO	benchmarking	is	based	on	four	national	
companies	sharing	the	same	German	transmission	regulatory	
and	“doing	business”	environments”,	even	if	some	kind	of	intra-
Germany	local	heterogeneity	can	remain.	As	a	result,	the	regu-
latory	risks	incurred	by	any	targeted	TSO	can	only	be	higher	in	
the	Dutch	regime	than	in	the	German’s.	The	second	difference	
is	grounded	in	the	scope	of	costs	that	escape	temporarily	from	
the	TOTEX	efficiency	targets.	In	Germany,	a	system	of	invest-
ment	 budget	 (IB)	 lowers	 the	 risks	 born	 by	 the	 TSOs	 as	 the	
investments	concerned	are	excluded	from	the	efficiency	targets	
for	one	or	two	regulatory	periods.
Great Britain represents an intermediary position	between	those	
two	types	of	regulatory	regimes.	First,	the	already	long	history	
of	British	 regulation	can	only	push	both	 risks	and	 incentives	
if	the	target	is	still	to	get	further	deep	cost	reduction.	Second,	
the	 British	 regime	 finally	 did	move	 to	 a	 TOTEX	 “approach”.	
This	 factor	 should	 also	 strengthen	 risk	 and	 incentives	 after	
more	 than	 two	decades	 of	 already	 sustained	 efficiency	 gains.	
However,	the	British	regime	astutely	combines	different	tools,	
where	benchmarking	is	only	a	snapshot	in	a	global	evaluation	
and	is	not	directly	used	in	the	calculation	of	efficiency	targets.	
Moreover,	 these	 targets	do	not	 touch	upon	the	assets	already	
integrated	in	the	RAB.	Finally,	the	British	regime	uses	a	“menu	
of	contracts”	where	the	TSO	chooses	its	preferred	combination	
of	 incentives	 and	 risks	 according	 to	 its	 managerial	 business	
strategy	 trajectory.	 Besides,	 several	 other	 adjustment	mecha-
nisms	are	implemented	in	order	to	link	the	actual	network	rev-
enues	to	defined	driver	changes	(such	as	generation	and	load	
connection,	network	constraints,	etc.).
Significantly	different	levels	of	costs	of	capital	are	allowed.	The	
British	gives	the	highest	(nominal	post-tax	vanilla	WACC	9.0%)	
while	 the	 Dutch	 and	 Belgian	 are	 the	 lowest	 (4.7%	 and	 4.3%	
respectively	with	a	hypothetical	notional	gearing	of	60%).	The	
allowed	capital	cost	in	France	and	in	Germany	is	mid-range.
Replacing existing regulatory regimes in 
their genuine national foundations…
The	heterogeneity	between	existing	national	regulatory	regimes	
can	mostly	be	understood	as	 a	 consequence	of	 the	building	of	
network	and	regulatory	regimes	at	the	national	level.	Existing	reg-
ulatory	regimes	are	the	genuine	results	of	intricate	processes	and	
interactions	of	various	factors	including	political	and	social	will-
ingness,	existing	institutional	and	governance	framework,	influ-
ence	of	interest	groups,	national	priorities	and	historical	paths.
The	alignment	between	the	economic	properties	of	a	regulatory	
regime	and	 the	particular	 specificities	of	 its	national	 founda-
tion	can	be	highlighted	in	four	key	points.	First,	the	investment	
financeability	 and	 the	 risks	 born	 by	 the	TSO	depend	 on	 the	
ambition	of	its	investment	plans.	Of	course	the	regulator	is	to	
make	sure	that	necessary	investments	are	happening.	However	
the	more	ambitious	and	the	riskier	the	investment	plan	is,	the	
more	sensitive	a	regulatory	regime	should	be	to	 its	capability	
of	 ensuring	 financeability	 and	minimizing	 the	 risks.	 Second,	
the	cost	of	capital	 experienced	by	 the	TSO	 in	 the	market	 for	
capital	should	influence	the	regulatory	choices	with	regard	to	
the	weight	of	financeability	and	of	 risk.	Third,	 the	 sensitivity	
of	a	regulatory	regime	with	cost	reduction	should	be	aligned	
with	the	potential	for	efficiency	gains.	If	there	is	only	a	small	
potential	for	efficiency	gains	on	the	TSO	side,	the	incentives	for	
cost	reduction	will	be	 less	relevant	 for	 the	regulatory	regime.	
Fourth	and	lastly,	all	regulatory	choices	are	made	with	an	eye	
on	the	impact	on	the	electricity	final	bill.
… while they become more regional and 
integrated with each other
The	national	isolated	foundations	in	which	regulatory	regimes	
have	 developed	 are	 no	 longer	 the	 only	 horizon.	 National	
regimes	 have	 been	 gradually	 influenced	 and	 remodeled	 by	 a	
European	 push	 for	wider	 integration	 and	 increasing	 interac-
tions	between	energy	and	network	systems.	Hence,	the	relative	
isolation	of	national	regulations	and	their	particular	misalign-
ments	are	heading	toward	a	past	state	of	nature.	It	 is	obvious	
that	 the	Third	Package	 and	 the	 Infrastructure	Package	made	
irreversible	 step	 toward	 an	 effective	 common	 EU	 regulatory	
frame.	 Furthermore,	 all	 the	 power	 transmission	 networks	
in	 the	North-West	 region	are	now	undertaken	 in	 a	 common	
regional	market	and	are	facing	similar	challenges	regarding	the	
need,	the	risks,	and	the	financeability	of	investments.
Toward a higher North-West harmonization 
of regulatory regimes
A	 higher	 level	 of	 regulation	 harmonization	 in	 the	 North-
West	Europe	is	now	needed	for	several	reasons.	First,	a	more	
common	and	investment-friendly	scheme	could	minimize	the	
cost	of	capital.	Improving	the	credibility	and	stability	of	regu-
latory	regimes	could	also	help	attract	new	potential	investors.	
Second,	cross-border	investments	could	be	favored	by	regula-
tory	regimes	with	common	economic	properties.	As	 the	net-
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work	might	 be	 expanded	where	 it	 would	 be	 optimal	 from	 a	
social	welfare	perspective	 instead	of	where	an	 investor	gets	a	
more	favorable	“private”	return.
A	certain	alignment	of	the	economic	properties	of	existing	reg-
ulatory	regimes	is	therefore	needed	in	the	context	of	a	common	
regional	market.	This	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 all	 the	 regulatory	
design	options,	all	parameters	or	revenue	components	should	
be	 exactly	 the	 same,	 but	 that	 the	 regulatory	 preferences	 and	
the	economic	properties	influencing	the	network	investments	
should	be	aligned	to	a	certain	extent.
